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The Politics and Poetics of Television Documentary in China 
Qing Cao 
  
Abstract  
Television documentary making in China first and foremost fulfils a political 
function
1
. From its emergence in 1958, TV documentary has been used as a propaganda tool 
for promulgating the political messages of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and 
disseminating its policies through the state broadcaster CCTV (China Central Television). 
After five and half decades’ of development, this function has remained largely unchanged 
despite the rise of multiple voices and the diversification of subject matter. This chapter 
delineates the broad contours of TV documentary development in the PRC (People’s 
Republic of China), focusing on its roles, functions and presentation styles, contextualised by 
contemporary Chinese sociopolitical transformations in recent decades. The chapter begins 
with an overview of TV documentary before moving to detail four phases of its development. 
This is followed by a case study of two documentary series – the controversial He Shang 
(River Elegy, 1988) and Da Guo Jue Qi (Rise of Great Powers, 2006), which illustrate the 
links between documentary filmmaking and its sociopolitical contexts. The chapter concludes 
with a critical assessment of the current dynamic situation of documentary films and their 
future development.    
 
Key words  
Television documentary, new documentary movement, independent documentary, He Shang, 
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Introduction  
 The year 2011 has been deemed ‘documentary channel year’ (jilupian yuan nian) in 
China due largely to the rising market demand for documentary films and the launch of eight 
documentary channels by the end of that year
2
. Since 2011, harnessing new media technology 
such as the Internet and mobile phones, major internet companies including Sohu, Xinlang, 
Tengxun, Aiyiqi, and China Online Television have started to host ‘documentary sites’ 
(Zhang and Hu, 2012). During 2012, 59,800 hours of documentary films were aired 
compared to 58,000 hours in 2011 whilst the revenue generated quadrupled between 2009 
and 2012, reaching 1.5 billion RMB (£160 million). China is ranked No. 1 in the world in 
terms of annual production of documentaries. The CCTV documentary channel (CCTV9) 
gained a staggering 660 million audience within less than two years of its 2011 launch – 
testimony to the rising popularity of TV documentary. This market-driven surge reflects both 
socioeconomic transformations and the nature and mode of mass communication.  
The roots of documentary film run deep in China’s political history. In 1958 
documentary film in the PRC was conceived of as an effective propaganda tool and became 
the dominant mode of TV reporting in the 1960s and 1970s. Documentary making during this 
period was thus predominantly a political activity – its function being first and foremost to 
disseminate government policies and indoctrinate socialist ideologies in the minds of the 
masses. Yet, documentary’s political role originated in the Republican period (1911-1949), in 
particular when Chinese nationalists used it to mobilise public support for the war efforts 
against the Japanese invasion (1937-1945).  
 However, three and half decades of economic reform have significantly changed the 
mass media landscape. The commercialisation drive of the media industry in the 1990s 
dislodged documentary film from state monopoly. Since then it has expanded substantially in 
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function, subject matter, style and voice. The instances of top-down, unitary, stern-faced and 
closed ‘voice-of-God’ (to be discussed later) documentary have gradually been reduced 
amidst the rise of sociocultural documentaries made by a diverse array of producers with 
differing perspectives. The partial de-politicization of the media industry has released the 
pent-up creative energy of media professionals, in particular the younger generations, who 
see documentary films differently from their predecessors. The current popularity of TV 
documentary in its various modes, in contrast to the tired dogmatic propagandist films, 
signifies a structural change in political communication, in state-society relations and in the 
dynamics of sociopolitical transformations. Nonetheless, documentary films like all other 
forms of media are centrally controlled and subject to the direct administrative supervision of 
the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT). The market-driven rapid 
development has always had an uneasy tension with the CCP’s impulse for bureaucratic 
control, though such a control has proved to be increasingly challenging. ‘New documentary 
movement’ (to be discussed later) producers, for example, have constantly sought to push 
boundaries by tackling ‘sensitive topics’ such as the Aids pandemic, environment, migrant 
workers and dispossessed farmers in order to reflect new social realities in China. 
On 7 February 2013, in an attempt to tighten its control of proliferating documentaries, 
the SARFT issued a new regulation centralising the management of documentary production 
through a system of publishing an officially proved list of documentary topics every six 
months, The same policy document also provides an official definition of documentary as ‘a 
television programme which represents the physical world and human society in a non-
fictional approach and is broadcast in an open channel’ (SARFT, 2013). Such a definition 
apparently excludes independently produced documentaries that are often shown privately or 
in non-conventional forums such as university seminars. These developments reflect both the 
dynamic change of documentary making, and the evolving relationships between political 
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control, market forces and socioeconomic transformations.  This chapter documents and 
discusses the development of television documentary in the PRC, through both a 
chronological and thematic account of the history, structure and key issues of documentary 
films. Throughout the chapter, emphasis is given to intrinsic linkages between TV 
documentaries, their roles and functions and the political, historical and cultural context. The 
chapter falls into three parts. The first part discusses the politics of documentary making in 
the PRC by examining four distinctive phases of documentary development. The second part 
considers the presentational style of documentary making that is itself a reflection of changed 
socioeconomic and political environment. The third part presents a case study of two 
documentary series to illustrate the extent to which documentary making is part and parcel of 
China’s political change. But before looking at these issues, it is perhaps useful to have an 
overview of documentary films in China as an imported though very popular genre of 
television programme making. 
 
Documentary films: a brief overview 
The term ‘documentary’ was first used by the pioneer filmmaker John Grierson in 1926 
for his film Moana – a film about life on a South Sea Island. Though the term lacks precision 
and is subject to different interpretations, it is generally understood as a non-fictional film 
that attempts to record some aspects of ‘reality’ (Nichols, 1991:12-14; Renov, 1993:1-11). 
Following the introduction of cinematic film to China in 1896, the first Chinese documentary 
War in Wuhan (Wuhan Zhanzheng) was produced in 1911 by the magician Zhu Liankui in 
association with Meili Company to record the dramatic military uprising in Wuchang that 
toppled the Qing Dynasty. War in Wuhan proved immensely popular on its first showing in 
Shanghai on the 1
st
 December 1911. The sensation it caused was due as much to its 
technological novelty as to the information the audience gained about the momentous 
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Xinghai revolution that had shaken the country. The Chinese translation of ‘documentary’ is 
jilupian, meaning ‘record film’. From its earliest years, Chinese documentary filmmakers 
focused their attention on the major political developments of the early 20
th
 century, 
documenting such pivotal events as the 1913 ‘second revolution’3 in Shanghai Geming 
(Shanghai Revolution) and the end of the World War I in Ou zhan zhu sheng you xin 
(Celebration Parade of the European War). Between 1922 and 1926, over 50 documentary 
films were produced, including the prominent Guomin waijiao youxing dahui (National 
protest on foreign policy issues) in 1923 on the government’s weak response to the Japanese 
‘21 demands’. These drastic sociopolitical upheavals provided documentary makers with 
opportunities to not only document the tumults with a camera but to make political statements 
on sociopolitical issues. Various political forces also discovered the power of documentary 
films for their political ends and both the nationalist and communist parties exploited them to 
gain political legitimacy, in particular during the post-war period (1945-1949). To some 
extent, the perceived value of documentary films is related to construct political legitimacy 
within the Confucian tradition. The Confucian doctrine of zhengmin (legitimate position) 
asserts that the exercise of power must be seen as legitimate by the public. To achieve this 
legitimacy, moral authority has to be gained, recognised, circulated and secured. Moral 
leadership, according to Confucius, must be derived from the exemplary behaviour of a 
leader. In practice however the image of moral authority – a prerequisite for political 
legitimacy – must be constructed and communicated effectively to the public. Naturally, in 
the modern era, any mass communication tool is important for such a task, particularly in a 
country the size of China. Given the turbulent nature of Chinese sociopolitical 
transformations, it is not surprising that throughout its development, documentary film has 
attained a strong political colour. 
6 
 
Currently documentary as a genre has become a crucial part of China’s television 
programming for over one billion viewers.  Production is under the direct control of the 
Department of Radio, Film and Television of each province which in turn is responsible to 
the central government agency SARFT. Documentary films are normally grouped into four 
broad categories of subject matter: history and current affairs, science and nature, social 
issues, and archival. They have all flourished amidst the rapidly expanding air time on 
documentary channels. However, despite a newly established system of commissioning to 
independent companies, the large majority of documentary films are either produced in house 
or bought overseas. With a separation of production and broadcasting within television 
stations, production departments have gradually become independent and, as all television 
stations in China are stated-owned, these ‘marketised’ production departments have formed 
self-supporting companies. Some, such as Zhongyang xinying jituan (Central New Film 
Group), remain in the state system. These companies have close ties with state broadcasters 
who have intimate knowledge of the official or ‘bottom lines’ of the CCP, and are therefore 
trusted to make major documentaries. Nonetheless, private companies with looser or no ties 
with broadcasters or government have also grown rapidly in recent years. Large private 
production companies include Beijing Shangzao yingshi gongsi (Beijing Shangzao Film and 
Television Company) and Sanduotang yingshi guanggao gongsi (Sanduotang Film, 
Television and Advertising Company) who have a total capital of nearly 100 million yuan 
(£10 million). They have expanded their operations from producing mainly TV 
advertisements to full documentary films including the high-profile Sanduotang co-produced 
TV series Rise of Great Powers.  
However, many ‘new documentary movement’ (also called ‘independent 
documentary’) filmmakers produce films largely outside the state system by raising capital 
privately and therefore do not go through the official procedures of planning and production 
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(Zhu and Mei, 2004; Berry et al; 2010; Robinson, 2012). Understandably such films are 
rarely distributed through the state broadcasting system and have to be screened either abroad 
or in small private or academic circles. If they are broadcast on state television channels, their 
heavily censored and much shorter versions become almost unrecognisable (Wang, 2010, 
2011). These marginalised producers face problems of a lack of financial and policy support 
as well as having little prospect of commercial success. They often seek funding abroad and 
participate in international film festivals and therefore have a diverse audience across national 
boundaries.  
 
The politics of documentary: four phases of development 
In the PRC, documentary films have been pivotal in mediating political, 
socioeconomic and cultural changes. Broadly speaking, documentaries have gone through 
four phases of development coinciding with China’s major upheavals and transformations. 
The first phase (1958-1977) was characterised by its political function of ideological 
indoctrination during the Maoist era. The second phase (1978-1992) started with the Deng 
Xiaoping’s economic reforms and saw a flowering of ‘humanistic documentaries’ focusing 
on cultural traditions and national identities in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. The 
third phase (1993-1998) can be seen as a popularisation of documentary films amidst the 
momentous wave of media commercialisation following Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 ‘southern 
tour talks’. The fourth phase (1999-present) is the more plural period in the post-Tiananmen 
age when increasing social as well as media spaces have opened up for a diverse range of 
producers making different types of documentaries. (He 2005:1; Xing, 2010:19-20).  
 
Political phase: 1958-1977 
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TV documentary shares the same birthday as television itself in the PRC – on the 1st 
May 1958 the first television station Beijing Television (changed to China Central Television 
on the 1
st
 May 1978) began broadcasting with a 10-minute documentary film produced by 
China Central News and Documentary Film Studio titled Going to the Countryside (dao 
nongcun qu). When first launched, the station had only thirty-four staff members and there 
were only 500 imported Russian black and white television sets in China - all concentrated in 
Beijing. These TV sets were owned by public institutions such as universities, the army, 
factories, communes and hospitals, though a few top leaders had them at home. During the 
initial 4-month trial period of the television station, a third of the programmes were 
documentaries. During the political period, or Mao’s era, documentary films operated purely 
as a political instrument for building a ‘socialist state’ - the documentary topics being limited 
to ‘socialist construction, achievements and heroes’. However, their impact was marginal due 
to the limited number of TV sets in China at that time.  
During the political period, one primary function of documentary was external 
communication. Isolated in the depths of the Cold War, in what China saw as a western 
‘information blockage’, the CCP regarded documentary film as an effective channel for 
external propaganda through news exchange programmes with ‘moderate’ western countries 
like the United Kingdom and Japan. Meanwhile, there was a strong desire in the west to 
know what was happening behind the ‘bamboo curtain’. Seizing the opportunity, the CCP 
tried to project an image of a new socialist China to the outside world through documentary 
films. In 1960 China sent sixty-one documentary films to seven countries, and by 1965, had 
established a news film exchange with twenty-seven countries, growing to eighty-three by 
1975. The documentary film exchange was seen by the CCP as an integral part of China’s 
international diplomacy because it believed that these films presented a ‘socialist image’ and 
transmitted China’s views on important international issues directly to a Western audience. 
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Due to their perceived importance, international news reports had to be approved by Premier 
Zhou Enlai personally before their overseas release.  
Whether for internal or external propaganda, political correctness is paramount and a 
‘san tang hui shen’ (a tripartite censor) censorship system was put in place for this purpose. 
San tang hui shen consisted of the then CCP Central Committee Radio Commission (zhong 
yang guangbo shiye ju), the TV station and its news department. The system brought top 
censors, TV station chiefs and programme operational staff together to scrutinize pre-
broadcast films. Considered as the ultimate guarantee of political safety, the system worked 
well for the CCP and survived the post-Mao era into the reform period. San tang hui shen 
was instrumental in producing an institutional culture of ‘(political) safety first’ that 
filmmakers had to internalize. Such a culture impacted on the style and mode of documentary 
films as well as social relationships – how filmmakers see themselves and relate to their 
subjects. Filmmakers became part of a propaganda machine constructing patriotism, 
socialism and the so-called socialist heroism that had become the order of the day. 
Individuals who are filmed in the documentary served merely as a symbol of a new socialist 
state as reflected in such documentaries as Tie guniang guo fenglian (Iron Girl Guo Fenglian), 
Tieren hai zai zhangdou (The Iron Man is still fighting), Ba qingchun xiangei nongcun (Give 
Our Youth to the Countryside) and Yingxiong de xinyang renmin (the Heroic Xinyang 
People). These films project new socialist model workers in rural areas and the industrial 
heartland of northeast China. Many of those shown in these documentaries became well-
known figures like Guo Fenglian (the iron girl) and Wang Jinxi (the iron man).  
Humanistic phase, 1978-1992 
The humanistic period was characterised by a rising interest in China’s national 
history and cultural heritage which, in Mao’s era, had been condemned as ‘feudal’ and 
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therefore ‘backward’. Documentary film as a genre gained unprecedented prominence 
throughout the 1980s when it shifted its focus from state socialism and class struggle to 
economic development, national identities and ‘liberating the mind’. Deng Xiaoping’s 
reforms brought new impetus to documentary making as departure from Maoist dogma led to 
a relaxation of political control and a more liberal leadership. Marxist orthodoxy gave way to 
cultural nationalism in a new wave of ‘national spirit’ building documentary series that took 
centre stage in the 1980s. 
 For a number of reasons, TV documentaries became popular programmes enjoyed by 
millions in China. First, in the transition from a class-based struggle for revolution to an 
economic development-centred society, these documentaries played a central role in 
constructing a new vision of society, of cultural identity and of the future. Second, the 
artificial, crude and overtly propagandist films shown mostly in the cinema changed to a new 
and refreshing style that appealed to the audience’s national sentiments and longing for a 
brighter future. Third, in the 1980s, due to a much improved national TV infrastructure and 
rising urban population income, television became affordable for most urban families, and 
watching it became a popular leisure activity. Fourth, documentary had been a major type of 
TV programme when there were few entertainment shows and limited channels before cable 
and satellite TVs became available and affordable to viewers in the 1990s.  
Cultural tradition and national identity, often embodied in landscape documentaries, 
became prevailing themes. These films avoided political subjects and engaged the viewers in 
their common cultural heritage of the Chinese civilisation which had been attacked from the 
1919 May Fourth Movement to the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Deliberately shaking 
off the former proselytising presentation style, filmmakers approached their viewers as 
ordinary people and tried to tell ‘a good story’ through engaging narratives. Huashuo 
Changjiang (Yangtze River) is a typical example of this style. This 25-part CCTV 
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documentary series was produced in association with a Japanese company and broadcast in 
1983. It became an instant hit with an audience share of 40%. The CCTV received over ten 
thousand letters from appreciative viewers. For the first time, on-screen presenters gave a 
fascinating account of national geography along the longest river in China. Huashuo means 
‘talk about’ – a term often used in Chinese traditional storytelling in novels and teahouses. 
The novel and informal huashuo style of story-telling by on-screen presenters was followed 
by other documentaries. High-profile documentary series during this period included the 17-
part Sichou zhilu (Silk Road, 1980), 35-part Huashuo yunhe (Grand Canal, 1986-87), 30-part 
Huang He (Yellow River, 1988), 6-part He Shang (River Elegy, 1988) and 12-part Wang 
Changcheng (the Great Wall, 1991).  
Television – the newly emergent vehicle of mass communication – came to be an 
important medium by which the political elites communicated to the general public. The 
convergence of the reform-minded CCP leaders pushing for a new developmentalist policy 
and cultural elites promoting a liberal agenda created conditions for a flourishing of 
humanistic films, culminating in the 1988 controversial He Shang (River elegy) which 
became a defining moment in the documentary genre as well as in China’s modern 
intellectual history. He Shang was blamed later by the CCP leaders for stirring up the student 
protests in 1989 for a fairer, transparent and accountable government. These films also 
became part and parcel of the rise of ‘wenhua re’ (cultural fever) that swept across the 
country throughout the 1980s. Wenhua re refers to the rise of interest in Chinese culture, 
western culture and the future of China in the post-reform era. It includes the emergence of 
liberalism in academic and intellectual circles, criticisms on autocratic politics and 
advocating the protection of individual rights against the intrusion of arbitrary state power. 
Liberalism was the earliest and first non-official intellectual development in post-reform 
China that arose as a response to radical Maoism. Influential intellectual leaders like Jin 
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Guantao and Liu Fengqing not only wrote and edited books including the popular Zuoxiang 
weilai congshu (Toward the Future Series) but appeared in the high profile documentary 
series He Shang.  The humanistic documentaries came to an end after the 1989 Tiananmen 
crackdown when the liberal cultural environment gradually disappeared amidst rising 
political conservatism. 
 
Popular phase, 1993-1998 
Moving away from the grand narrative of politics, economy and nation, filmmakers in 
the 1990s started to be drawn to ordinary people’s lives in the ‘popular phase’, or pingmin 
hua (shift to the ordinary people). Individuals rather than abstract ideas became central to a 
series of highly innovative documentaries. Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 southern tour generated a 
fresh wave of economic growth that had a profound impact on society. Social life-based 
documentaries started to emerge that focused on people’s lived experiences. Mao’s 
communist utopia and the 1980s high-spirited liberal idealism gave way to a mundane social 
space wherein the 1990s filmmakers engaged with stories of individuals whose pent-up 
energy is largely directed to opportunities open to them to improve their lives. The 
marketization of documentary production amidst the commercialisation of the media industry 
fuelled a surge of documentary making. In 1993, a ‘producer system’ was established 
wherein filmmakers could sign a contract with the CCTV to produce documentaries. A 
portion of the 5-minute advertising revenue from each episode could be retained by the 
producer to fund new documentaries. This reform gave filmmakers considerable leverage, if 
not autonomy, in content, style and staffing that enabled them to cater to ‘market demands’. 
In the same year two documentary series became immensely popular – Shanghai Television’s 
Jilupian bianjishi (Documentary Editorial Room) and the CCTV Dongfang Shikong (Oriental 
Horizon). Both of these focused on ordinary people’s lives and largely removed political 
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indoctrination as filmmakers began to treat their subjects as equals rather than as signs of an 
abstract ideology. In1993, television replaced cinema as the dominant medium for 
documentary film and media marketization produced spaces for independent documentary 
making albeit in non-political spaces.  
One of the most important developments during this phase was the emergence of the 
so-called xinjilu yundong (new documentary movement) that started in 1992 following an 
informal meeting by a group of young filmmakers frustrated by the sterile style and narrow 
focus of the dominant state system documentaries. They called their documentaries ‘new’ in 
an attempt to break away from the prevailing propaganda style of zhuantipian (special topic 
documentary) in documentary making and created a new way of documenting social life, in 
contrast to what they saw as ‘the fake, exaggerated, and empty characteristics of not only the 
old socialist realist documentaries but also the more recent special topic programme’ (Lu, 
2010:17). Liulang Beijing: zuihou de mengxiang zhe (Bumming in Beijing: the last dreamers) 
made in 1990 by Wu Wenguang is seen as the first and most successful xin jilu yundong 
documentary that tells the story of five ‘roaming’ artists pursuing their dreams in hardship 
outside the state system. For the first time, invisible, insignificant and marginalised people 
living in the shadow of a large metropolis became the protagonists of a documentary. This 
and other new movement documentaries – 1966, Wode hongweibing shidai (1966: My Red 
Guard years), Wo biye le (I have graduated), Tiananmen and Bi an (The other side of the 
bank) - received critical acclaim in the media circles (Lu, 2010). The new documentary films 
shifted the focus from previous ‘public topics’ such as the nation, the state, culture and 
history to hitherto neglected private topics like family and emotional experiences taking place 
in private, domestic space. Nonetheless, this new documentary movement is better 
understood as a pluralisation rather than a break with the previous top-down documentaries. 
It extended rather than replaced the subject matter, presentation style and basic assumptions 
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of previous documentaries. Thus, despite its prominence and impact, the new documentary 
movement has more continuities than ruptures with the past. 
 
Plural phase, 1999-present  
Toward the end of the 20
th
 century when capitalism had taken root with ‘Chinese 
characteristics’, a variety of social issues such as the widening rich-poor gap arose and 
intensified . Taking notice of growing social strife amidst rapid economic growth, some 
documentary makers assumed the role of a ‘mediator’ in producing films highlighting these 
problems. In contrast to the 1990s’ tendency to recount individual lives which are at times 
isolated from the social environment, filmmakers in the new century have turned their 
attention to society as a whole and emphasise ‘social responsibility’ in documentary making. 
To redress the negative effects of market forces of the 1990s, documentary filmmakers 
highlight the nature of TV programmes as a public space, if not a ‘public sphere’, for social 
intervention through open discussions and debates (Berry and Rofel, 2010:136). Social space 
here refers to the space wherein people can express their views on important social issues like 
the plight of dispossessed peasants with little openly direct political intervention or 
retribution. However, such a social space is different from the Habermasian ‘public sphere’ 
that indicates a platform for political participation in a ‘civil society’ (Habermas, 1992). 
Social issues are discussed in new documentary movement films which take an 
interventionist approach as in Sanxia Yimin (Three Gorges Dam migration), yige aizibing 
huanzhe de mingyun (Fate of an AIDs sufferer) and Chunmin de xuanzhe (Villagers’ choice). 
These documentaries deal with critical but controversial issues that are not normally shown 
on television such as mass migration, the Aids epidemic and village elections. Armed with 
the new technology of DV (digital video), independent documentary makers in the new 
century have become more self-conscious in producing social critiques. Their documentaries 
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are characterised by a change‘… from observation to participation, from spontaneous to 
inspirational filmmaking, from using descriptive to evaluative language, from documenting 
for history to filmmaking for social mobilisation’ (Wang, 2010). 
 
 On the other hand, big-budget documentary series shown in the CCTV that focus 
once again on Chinese history and nation like Fuxing zhilu (Road to Revival, 2007) and 
Yiheyuan (Summer Palace, 2010) have also thrived. Increasingly documentary series on 
international topics such as Daguo jueqi (Rise of Great Powers, 2006), Huaerjie (The Wall 
Street, 2010), Jinzhuan zhiguo (BRICs Countries, 2011) and Huobi (money, 2012) have been 
produced as China’s international role has grown. These series return to the topics of modern 
history and national identity of the 1980s though with a rather different and more confident 
perspective (see case study below). The radical and critical views shown in River Elegy are 
largely absent from these documentaries despite a wider range of interpretations being 
offered within the officially-sanctioned boundaries. The parallel development of mainstream 
documentary series and independently produced documentary films shown largely outside the 
state system reflects the increasingly complex and diversified landscape of documentary 
making in China – a situation described as ‘polyphony’ compared to the previous three 
phases (Zhu,2007:26) detailed earlier. 
The changing pattern of documentary making coincides with China’s shifting 
socioeconomic transformations. Each phase of documentary development is inherently linked 
to pivotal political developments – the Great Leap Forward in 1958 (Phase 1), the launch of 
economic reform in 1978 (Phase 2), Deng Xiaoping ‘south tour talks’ in 1992 (Phase 3), and 
emerging social tensions towards the end of the 20
th
 century (Phase 4). Despite the 
progressive changes made over these four phases, the media have always operated within the 
established perimeters of the party-state, though the situation has become more complex in 
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recent decades when market forces began to play an important role. The dominance of 
politics has gradually been weakened by a plethora of other forces such as the 
commercialised media environment, the advance of new information technology and the 
socioeconomic transformations of the society. The contextual background has changed 
rapidly - from Maoist socialism to Dengist developmentalism through to the current party-
state capitalism. Correspondingly documentary’s functions have shifted from being a pure 
propaganda tool to a political and intellectual elites’ vehicle for political persuasion and then 
to a mediator of sociopolitical changes - though the party-state has maintained a hegemonic 
voice. Since the inauguration of the fifth generation of the CCP leadership, the Xi-Li (the 
CCP Party General Secretary Xi Jinping and the State Council Premier Li Keqiang) 
administration, came to power in the spring of 2013, there has been no indication that the 
CCP will loosen its control over the media. While the Chinese leaders have become more 
confident in dealing with international affairs, they are fully aware of domestic problems 
including government officials’ corruption, environment pollution and extensive popular 
protests. The CCP has always believed that the mass media are at the forefront of the battle to 
maintain stability, so in order to control the grave situation, they cannot afford to leave any 
medium uncensored. The broad features of the four periods of documentary are summarised 
below: 
  
Features 1958-1977 
Political 
1978-1992 
Humanistic  
1993-1998 
Popular 
1999-present 
Social 
Context Maoist socialism, 
Communist ideology 
Deng Xiaoping’s 
economic reform 
and opening  
Embracing global 
capitalism, media 
commercialisation   
Growing social 
tensions 
Discourse Ideological  Intellectual  Populist  Plural  
Function State propaganda tool Political and 
cultural elites’ 
vehicle of 
communication  
Multiple roles 
including 
commercial profit  
Multiple roles 
including 
vehicle for 
social issues 
discussion 
Power 
relation 
State autocratic 
power 
Elitist, top-down  Mediating between 
the state and market 
Increasing 
power 
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dispersion  
through 
negotiation  
Finance State-funded State-funded State-owned but 
commercially 
operated 
Diverse forms 
of financing, 
including 
private  
Technology One TV channel,  
few TV sets, 
Limited TV 
channels, but more 
TV sets 
Diversification of 
TV channels; most 
homes have TV sets 
Diverse forms 
of channels; 
nearly all homes 
have TVs. 
Voice Homogeneous  Diverse voices  Heterogeneous Heterogeneous 
Style Indoctrinating, 
preaching  
Less political, more 
intellectual  
Engaging, 
entertaining, 
Diverse  
 
Table 1: Features of TV documentaries in different periods (also see Xing 2010:19) 
 
 
The poetics of documentary making: evolving mode of presentation  
Documentary modes 
Lyotard (1984) distinguishes two types of knowledge - scientific and narrative. The 
major difference between them is that narrative knowledge, unlike scientific knowledge, does 
not give priority to its own legitimation, but certifies itself in the pragmatics of its own 
transmission. Television documentary as a particular narrative genre has a type of 
‘metadiscourse’ (Lyotard 1984: xxiii) as a legitimating system and constructs knowledge and 
truth in its own way. Its legitimation lies in the way in which it is presented - legitimation is 
enmeshed with a specific mode of representation. This can be understood as the ‘poetics’ of 
documentary making - ‘those principles of construction, function, and effect specific to 
nonfiction film and video’ (Renov, 1993:21). Indeed, such poetics is inherently linked to the 
use of language in all forms of presentation as Barthes (1989:172) argues: ‘… poetics is 
therefore at once very old (linked to the whole rhetorical culture of our civilisation) and very 
new, insofar as it can today benefit from the important renewal of the sciences of language.’ 
Thus, in a broad sense, addressing the question of why, the ‘politics’ of documentary, is 
concerned with sociopolitical contexts that give rise to a particular type of Chinese 
documentary,  whereas ‘poetics’ is more concerned with the how question: how language 
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produces meaning in the service of interests. However, the poetics and politics are intricately 
linked as the former is the means through which the latter is realised. Therefore, 
documentaries do not simply ‘record’ social realities through narrative, they produce 
discourse: stories are told not only to generate meaning, but to construct knowledge in a 
matrix of relations of power.  
Bill Nichols (1991:32-68) summarises four dominant modes of documentary 
representation - expository, observational, interactive, and reflexive. Each has its own distinct 
way of constructing authority and claiming truth. The expository mode addresses the viewer 
directly in advancing an argument about the historical world, often in a ‘voice-of-God’ 
commentary. It is considered as ‘heavy’ and the most ‘authoritarian’ type of documentary 
(Corner, 1996:30). The voice-of-God commentary refers to the early direct-address style in 
the Grierson tradition of documentary using an ‘authoritarian’ and presumptuous off-screen 
narration. Such an omniscient ‘voice of god’ dominates visuals that exist merely to advance 
the argument contained in the commentary. This commentary insistently encourages the 
viewer to read the images in a specific way. The observational mode arises from 
dissatisfaction with the moralising quality of expository documentary, and therefore attempts 
to record ‘unobtrusively’ what people do. The interactive and reflexive modes assume much 
less authority and engage in a process of meaning negotiation through interaction or 
reflection. Nichols (1991:33-4) argues: 
A mode of representation involves issues of authority and the credibility of speech. 
Rather than standing as the idiosyncratic utterance of the individual filmmaker, the 
text demonstrates compliance with the norms and conventions governing a particular 
mode and, in turn, enjoys the prestige of tradition and the authority of a socially 
established and institutionally legitimate voice. 
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Expository documentary: top-down communication 
Many documentaries in China, in particular those from the political and humanistic 
periods, predominantly use the classic expository mode. In the early years, the mouthpiece 
function required documentary films to convey the official CCP lines in a straightforward 
fashion. Documentaries are typically presented with a heavy ‘voice-of-God’ commentary. 
Using Kozloff’s term (1992:84), this ‘heterodiegetic’ voice’ addresses the audience with the 
highest degree of omniscience in a manipulation of the mythic and leaves much of the 
mimetic to the visuals. During much of the Mao era the visuals were carefully contrived. The 
1953 Weida de tudi gaige (The Great Land Reform) documentary presents land reform as the 
only road to prosperity for the Chinese peasantry.  The film shows how poverty was created 
by the ruthless exploitation of poor peasants by landlords. Throughout the film striking 
images are extensively employed showing denunciations of landlords’ crimes, happy faces of 
peasants gaining new lands, new local peasant representative conferences, and machinery 
used in the new socialist China. A range of documentaries produced in the 1960s and 1970s 
portray new socialist model workers and work units such as the 1964 Dazai zhilu (The Road 
of Dazai), 1965 Ganxiang gangan de daqing ren (Daqing People Dare to Think and Act) and 
1970 Hongqi Qu (Red Flag Canal). These documentaries portray the single-minded 
determination of peasants and workers answering the call for a socialist cause, who meet 
challenges in difficult conditions. These expository documentaries deliver an unproblematic 
and ‘objective’ account and interpretation of various Maoist socialist campaigns. Voice-over 
as an extra-diegetic soundtrack acts in a similar way to the CCP newspaper editorials in a 
patriarchal, dominant and omniscient control over meaning. The prevalence of the expository 
mode reflects a Leninist tradition of seeing news reports as ‘visualization of politics’. 
Filmmakers were required to reflect socialist life through reporting ‘typical events and 
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activities of typical characters in a typical environment’. The CCP’s political and aesthetic 
objective for documentary films was the so-called ‘combination of revolutionary romanticism 
with revolutionary heroism’. It meant filmmakers needed to come up with ingenious ways of 
constructing, if not fabricating, a heroic and romanticized version of socialism through 
portraying ‘typical individuals, events and environment’. One of the most successful 
documentaries Shouzuyuan (Tax collection house), produced in1965, was repeated for eight 
years (1966-74). Its class struggle theme is presented through engaging artistic forms that 
include clay figures, popular tunes and personal narratives. This authoritarian style is 
‘dogmatic’ in the sense that it is the unitary, top-down and monological voice of the official 
doctrine (Chu, 2007:26).  
Such films were often produced in the zhuantipian (special topic documentaries) 
format related to the heyday of socialist cinema. Before television became the dominant 
medium of political communication, newsreels Xinwen Jianbao (News Clips) were shown in 
cinema before feature movies produced by Central Newsreel and Documentary Film Studio. 
Guided by ‘socialist realism’ aesthetics, such films portray socialist achievements through 
bright colours, cheerful music and imposing socialist heroes. The stage-managed images are 
presented on the principle of representing the ‘real’ through enhanced ‘typical’ new socialist 
men and women. The expository mode was however softened during the 1980s’ humanistic 
phase when on-screen presenters and interviews were introduced, starting in 1983 with the 
25-episode CCTV series Huashuo Changjiang. Though voiceover commentary remained the 
dominant style of narration, humanistic documentaries nonetheless created a presentation 
style, such as using informal interviews, that better engaged the audience, In particular, 
following the structure of well-known traditional novels and story-telling in teahouses, they 
presented each episode in a zhanghui ti xiaoshuo (chapter-based novel) format. It is notable 
that, despite the rise of popular documentaries and multi-voice in the post-Tiananmen period, 
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a moderate version of the expository mode has persisted as an important style in major 
documentary series in the 2000s. To some extent, such a heavy expository style is inevitable 
due to the nature of mainstream documentaries that present a closed, monological, single-
dimensional but official version of the ‘realities’. One of the primary objectives of such 
documentaries is still ‘guiding public opinion’ though in a more subtle fashion than 
previously. The ‘mouthpiece’ role fits in naturally with the expository mode of presentation 
that imposes an official discourse on major developments on important domestic and 
international issues. Notwithstanding the proliferation and diversification of films in the 
2000s, expository documentaries about the state, nation and history such as the CCTV series 
Gugong (Forbidden City, 2004), Daguo Jueqi (Rise of Great Powers, 2006) and Fuxing zhilu 
(Road to Revival, 2007), continue to flourish.  
Observational documentary: bottom-up perspectives 
It was not until the 1990s that other modes of presentation arose amidst the wave of 
the new documentary movement that actively sought to break the prevalent sterile expository 
style. New documentary films focusing on ordinary people’s lives in the ‘popular’ and 
‘plural’ phases apply a combination of observational and interactive modes. Meanwhile, 
filmmakers became less intrusive in their approach to filming subjects. This change of style 
also reflected dissatisfaction with previous moralistic documentaries (Lu, 2003; Berry et al, 
2010). Despite a shift to cultural and historical topics, the lecturing style in the 1980s was 
increasingly divorced from the changed post-reform social realities. Recognising the 
imperative of understanding social change in a bottom-up rather than top-down manner, 
independent filmmakers sought to reflect real life through experimenting with fresh modes of 
presentation. By emphasising the perspective of those affected by social change, the 
rebellious ‘bottom-up’ filmmakers attempted to create a link between documentaries and the 
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lives of ordinary people. In the new century, the composition of documentary makers has also 
changed. They not only come from the television sector, but from art circles, educational 
institutions, fine art and multimedia. Some focus on an experimental avant-garde style and an 
exploration of new film language. In presenting marginalised social groups like ethnic 
minorities, sex workers, low-income labourers and substance abusers, their documentaries are 
imbued with a resistant and subversive message in both form and content.   
‘Bumming in Beijing’ is shot by a hand-held camera with synch sound but no 
artificial lighting. It is part of a new spontaneous mode of filmmaking called jishi zhuyi (on-
the-spot realism) that documents life as it happens with minimal intervention from the 
filmmaker. Independent documentary makers try to present yuan shengtai (raw, pristine 
reality) using a combination of the observational and reflexive modes. Yuan shengtai 
documentaries contrast sharply with the often exaggerated ‘voice-of-god’, moralistic 
mainstream films. ‘New movement’ filmmakers including Wu Wenguang, Duan Jinchuan 
and Zhang Yuan share a common objective of showing ‘real life’ China in a way that invites 
the audience to interpret their meanings. 
 In the late 1990s, the second wave of ‘new documentary movement’ arose with the 
introduction of mobile, unobtrusive and affordable digital video. A new generation of 
filmmakers growing up in a different environment started to experiment with avant-garde 
film techniques while continuing to focus on marginalized social groups. Other filmmakers 
however pursued dramatisation of engaging stories, largely to attract viewers’ attention and 
fuelled by a new wave of commercialization of TV documentaries competing with imported 
programmes such as those from the Discovery Channel. Digital video is suited for making 
documentaries on private lives; it also frees filmmakers from the state system. Jishi zhuyi 
documentary makers are drawn to the cinema vérité tradition of filmmaking. They produce 
novel documentaries that follow both the fly-on-the-wall style of American Direct Cinema 
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emphasizing objectivity, and the participatory style that reveals the filmmakers’ presence. 
These observational and reflexive documentaries use minimal voiceover narration to make 
the meanings of their films deliberately ambiguous in order to avoid direct criticism of the 
state, as in the documentary Out of Phoenix Bridge and Meishi Street.  
Case studies: from cultural critique to authoritarian statism   
He Shang: a liberal challenge to the authoritarian state  
He Shang (River elegy) is a controversial CCTV six-part documentary made and 
broadcast in 1988 that critiques China’s entrenched state-centric polity. It attributes the 
Chinese nation’s decline in modern times to an autocratic political system that resists 
meaningful reforms. The Yellow River, the Great Wall and the dragon – traditional symbols 
of the Chinese nation – are used to signify the backwardness of this ‘land-based’ civilisation 
which needs to embrace Western maritime ‘blue civilisation’. The documentary series caused 
widespread controversy and heated discussions with its daring declaration of the death of the 
mother river Huang He (Yellow River) – it is like asserting the death of God in the West. 
However, this iconoclastic attack on traditional Confucian culture is largely symbolic and 
was interpreted by the audience as a thinly veiled criticism of the current political system. 
The relevance of traditional autocratic rule to contemporary practice is laid bare when Liu 
Shaoqi, the president of China, is described in the documentary as being left to die on the 
floor of an empty room during the Cultural Revolution. The message for urgent political 
reform is made crystal clear. What is remarkable about the series is that it was produced and 
broadcast by the CCTV – China’s pre-eminent mouthpiece of the CCP. The ‘bold’ move by 
the CCTV epitomised the newly emerging space in the mass media for alternative voices. It 
also indicated the modification of the role of media professionals in the reform age when the 
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‘people’s character’ of journalism started to expand, alongside with the dominant role of the 
‘Party’s character’.   
 However, the significance of this ground-breaking series goes beyond the media – it 
represents the culmination of the liberal critique of the authoritarian state of the 1980s when 
liberal-minded intellectuals demystified the ‘holy trinity’ of the Chinese nation, state and the 
CCP constructed by the CCP. Locating the autocratic state as the main barrier to China’s 
search for a viable route to modernity, the documentary film reflects the unprecedented 
intellectual freedom of the 1980s when intellectuals engaged in debates about Chinese 
tradition, western culture and China’s future development. In making full use of the mass 
media, some filmmakers tried to disseminate liberal knowledge in an effort to ‘enlighten’ the 
general public. Nonetheless, He Shang adopts a primarily expository mode of presentation 
with a voiceover commentary and interviews with ‘experts’ - many being leading ‘cultural 
studies scholars’. Unlike the previous construction of truth and knowledge based on 
‘unassailable’ Marxist and Maoist dogmas, He Shang presents an implicitly anti-
establishment intellectual argument that derives its legitimacy and power from the authority 
of those ‘intellectuals’ who had gained much respect in the post-reform 1980s as ‘spokesmen’ 
of the nation and people. Rather than being the CCP’s mouthpiece, He Shang became the 
vehicle of the newly arisen intellectuals to spread the gospel of change. To some extent, these 
intellectuals resemble their predecessors in the May Fourth Movement in attacking Confucian 
tradition and advocating democracy as a remedy for China’s problems, though the latter 
could speak their mind freely.  
Before its run was complete, He Shang had aroused so much controversy with the 
public and led to so many divided opinions among the top CCP leaders that the CCTV held 
internal meetings to discuss if broadcasting should be terminated. However, the series proved 
so popular that the CCTV repeated it though ‘sensitive’ parts of the original version were 
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removed in the second show. Less than a year after the 1989 Tiananmen protests and the 
associated crackdown, He Shang was banned and a nation-wide campaign was launched 
attacking the film as advocating a Western bourgeoisie liberalism that stirs up unrest. The 
political campaign silenced the intellectual debate on the provocative views the series 
presents. The dramatic ups and downs of this documentary series largely parallel the rise and 
fall of Chinese liberals both within and outside the establishment. No other documentary film 
in the PRC history has exerted such a powerful impact on political and intellectual 
development – even today He Shang is carefully avoided in open discussions though issues 
raised in the film are as pertinent and controversial today as they were in the 1980s. 
 
Da Guo Jue Qi: a conservative validation of an authoritarian state  
In contrast to He Shang’s liberal critique, Da Guo Jue Qi is a conservative though 
conditional endorsement of the authoritarian state. Its legitimacy however is drawn from a 
combination of Western legalism and Confucian minben ideology. The 12-part series, 
broadcast by the CCTV in November 2006, details the rise of nine ‘world powers’ since 1500 
- Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, the USA and 
Japan. The documentary aims, as a senior CCTV official put it, ‘to provide historical and 
civilizational context to the discussion of China’s national development issues’ (Zhao, 2006: 
Preface). The issues raised in Da Guo Jue Qi nonetheless are different from He Shang – it 
explores what role the Chinese state needs to adopt on its road to a great power status. 
In the early years of the 21
st
 century, following three decades of economic growth, 
and in contrast to the anxiety and acute awareness of its weakness in the 1980s, China had 
become more confident. Around mid-1990s, the post-Tiananmen political conservatism and 
perceived anti-China post-cold war international environment spurred on the rise of cultural 
nationalism. Da Guo Jue Qi reflects this change of mood in both the political and intellectual 
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life of China. It presents a broad assessment of the external world upon which the current 
pragmatic policies are based.  
Ironically, however, the basic evaluations of the West made by Da Guo Jue Qi are 
similar to those of He Shang – both series portray a positive image of the West although for 
different reasons. The former emphasises the progressive role of Western national leaders and 
the legal framework within which they operate; the latter highlights the role of liberal 
democracy in driving Western progress, not only in terms of the wealth and power of 
industrialist modernity but in terms of the democracy, rule of law and human liberalism of 
humanist modernity. In affirming the crucial role of national leaders, the rule of law and 
science and technology, Da Guo Jue Qi naturalizes, legitimizes and reinforces authoritarian 
technocratic rule. Effectively Da Guo Jue Qi seeks consensual support from the audience and 
excludes potential or sublimated oppositional discourses that are unable to gain entry into the 
CCTV, at least not in the same radical form as He Shang. However, Da Guo Jue Qi’s stress 
on the rule of law is understood in the matrix of Chinese politics as a reminder of the limit to 
which the political elite exercises its power - the ‘mandate of heaven’ has changed to 
‘mandate of the people’- though how it works is left largely to viewers’ imagination. 
Democracy is alluded to but carefully toned down. Nonetheless the film renounces any 
legitimizing cloak of a Marxist class struggle-based ideology despite the implicit industrialist 
modernity it invokes.  
Da Guo Jue Qi has received positive reviews from mainstream commentators despite 
criticism from both liberals and new leftists. The term ‘Chinese liberals’ refers to those who 
see the Chinese future as adopting a liberal democratic polity; the new leftists are those who 
draw upon Western New Left theories to explain China’s problems as being derived from the 
‘invasion’ of global capitalism and who seek to solve these problems by returning to some 
Maoist practices. In criticising Da Guo Jue Qi, the liberals point to the documentary’s failure 
27 
 
to highlight the role of democracy. The new leftists however accuse the series of glorifying 
jungle law capitalism. Nonetheless, unlike He Shang, which enjoyed political support from 
the top, Da Guo Jue Qi’s liberal and new left critics do not have political backing, though 
each group has gained extensive support among different sections of society. Though their 
radical faction was purged in the 1989 crackdown, Chinese liberals represent a steady force 
pushing for Chinese democratic change. Their support for property rights, rule of law and 
free competition has won new constituencies within an emerging middle class. Armed with 
Western New Left theories, China’s new leftists present themselves as defenders of people’s 
rights, and appeal to those who see China’s problems as associated with global capitalism 
(Ma, 2012). Significantly, criticisms from the right and left turn Da Guo Jue Qi into a 
somewhat mainstream view echoing the policies of a Chinese leadership that is undemocratic 
but open to the world and ferociously focused on economic development. To some extent, the 
existence of the liberal and new left depends on the overlapping of their values with official 
policies. The liberals’ support for full-scale reform, a market economy and external 
engagement is congruent with the CCP’s embrace of the global capitalist economy. The new 
left’s emphasis on social justice, equality and support for disadvantaged groups resonates 
with the official rhetoric of the Hu/Wen (President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao) 
‘harmonious society’ and ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ (Xiao, 2012).  
Da Guo Jue Qi indicates the position of a pragmatic political elite situated at the 
centre of a nationalist spectrum that counterbalances the liberal, pro-market right and anti-
capitalist new left. Tolerance of these alternatives depends on a broad consensus at the top – a 
situation different from the 1980s when the CCP leadership was torn between a reformed 
socialist approach and a liberal market approach. Post-Deng leaderships reached a consensus 
that China should pursue a pragmatic developmentalist policy. Nonetheless, the political elite 
walk a tightrope between allowing alternative voices and containing them, so as not to 
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undermine their dominant position and domestic stability. Despite growing diversity in non-
political areas, the CCTV as the primary state network maintains a tight editorial control. The 
domain of history, for example, remains firmly guarded by the CCP propaganda department. 
From He Shang’s liberal critique to Da Guo Jue Qi’s conditional endorsement of an 
authoritarian state, documentary film is intertwined with the political developments of the 
day. Despite complex and radical changes, TV documentary is still considered as an 
important tool of public communication and is therefore a preferred platform of the political 
and intellectual elites for shaping public opinion. Nonetheless, documentaries have become 
increasingly diverse in their roles, functions, content, audience and channels of dissemination.  
 
Conclusions: documentaries between the mouthpiece and ‘modern bard’  
The development of documentary films over the last five and half decades in the PRC 
reflects the evolution of the CCP’s political power. Despite the hegemonic position the CCP 
holds in deciding what the viewers can see, the last two decades have seen an increasing 
space for discursive negotiations to take place in documentaries. In a post-socialist China, the 
political elite’s power and legitimacy depends on their ability to provide social welfare, their 
capacity to change with time and their means of public communication. Change, however, is 
no longer brought about by a simple implementation of policies determined solely by the 
political elites. There is a growing tendency for various social actors to be engaged in a 
process of negotiation – documentary films provide this process with a genuine, though much 
restricted, platform. The increased space for alternative discourses poses a growing pressure 
on the political elites – that partially explains the constant effort made by the propaganda 
department in tightening controls. They have to use their dominant discursive position to 
cultivate a public attitude and knowledge congruent with their policies. The CCP’s 
authoritarian power over documentary films like Fuxing zhilu helps achieve precisely that 
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objective. Nonetheless, changes in documentary film have been brought about primarily by a 
market-oriented reform that has enabled a progressive erosion of media control. Limited 
deregulation has led to a widening of participation and voice in a process of change described 
as moving ‘from dogma to polyphony’ (Chu, 2007), ‘from control to negotiation’ (Huang, 
2007) and ‘from propaganda to hegemony’ (Zhang, 2011). The currently marginalised 
independent documentaries have taken root and are gradually sifting through society. The 
very existence of the new documentary movement speaks volumes of the need to produce 
documentaries that reflect genuinely people’s living conditions, thinking and aspirations.  
Three types of documentary discourse can be discerned over the last half century – the 
official discourse dominating the political phase, the broadly intellectual discourse arising in 
the humanistic phase and the popular discourse emerging in the ‘popular’ phases. However, 
all three strands of discourse continue to develop in the 21
st
 century, forming a plural picture. 
In a plural but official-dominated media space, documentary film has become somewhat 
fragmented. Amidst rising popular culture fuelled by media commercialisation, elitist 
documentaries no longer attract the extensive public attention as they did in the 1980s, and 
therefore are being marginalised and pushed to ‘narrowcasting’. On the other hand, official 
discourse is dominant in major TV series, ranging from history such as Gugong ‘Forbidden 
City’ (2004), Fuxin zhilu ‘Road to Revival’ (2007) and Shijie lishi (World History, 2008) to 
economy like Gongsi de liliang (Power of Business Corporations, 2009), Hua er jie (Wall 
Street, 2010) and Jin zhuan zhi guo (BRICs Countries, 2011). Vast resources and state media 
status make it possible for the CCTV to produce and broadcast major documentary series that 
highlight official discourse.  
Nevertheless, official discourse has been subtly blended with intellectual input by 
academics involved in producing TV series as ‘subject experts’ from research institutions and 
universities. Despite the increasing diversity, the CCTV prioritises ‘mainstream’ (zhu xuan lu) 
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documentaries to fulfil its mouthpiece function. Yet, the mouthpiece has become keenly 
aware of the need to play a tune pleasant to public ears. The CCTV and other state media 
institutions are undergoing transformations whereby media professionals try to position 
themselves as the ‘modern bard’ (Fiske and Hartley, 1982) of the people whilst 
simultaneously retaining the mouthpiece function. The official discourse, mediated by 
academics and progressive media practitioners has created a new type of hybridity generating 
an innovative mode of discursive formation for producing meaning, constructing knowledge 
and changing power relations. Plurality is thus constituted by a media space wherein various 
documentaries can compete, though official hybridised discourses try to co-opt viewers to 
their dominant interpretations. Documentary films in their ambivalent negotiation between a 
CCP ‘mouthpiece’ and a ‘modern bard’ reveal the evolving roles of the mass media. It is 
difficult to ascertain to what extent the official documentary discourse can hold its hegemonic 
position, but one thing is certain; due to the changed sociopolitical environment and a better 
informed public in an increasingly open society, there is no going back to the old heavy 
propagandist route in documentary films.  
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 These eight channels are China Central Television Documentary Channel (Zhonngyang dianshitai jilupian 
pindao, or CCTV9), China Central Television Science and Education Channel (Zhongyang dianshitai kejiao 
pindao, or CCTV10), China Education Television Channel 3 (Zhongguo jiaoyu dianshitai san pindao), Beijing 
High Definition Documentary Channel (Beijing gaoqing jishi pindao), Shanghai Documentary Channel 
(Shanghai jishii pindao), Chongqing Science and Education Channel (Chongqing kejiao pindao), Hunan Golden 
Eagle Documentary Channel (Hunan jinying jishi pindao), and Liaoning North Channel (Liaoning beifang 
pindao).  
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3
 It refers to the 1913 military campaign led by Sun Yat-sen against the Yuan Shikai government following the 
assassination of the Nationalist Party leader Song Jiaoren.  
